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From its origins in colonial Massachusetts’s 1642 and 1647 school laws1 to No
Child Left Behind’s2 contemporary successor, the Every Student Succeeds Act,3
education has remained a storied and lasting component of our nation’s heritage.
Today, all state constitutions guarantee education in “some form.”4 Though educa-
tion has long existed in our nation’s history, perspectives vary widely as to the best
way to educate our children.5 Accordingly, lawmakers and activists, fed up with
stagnant and declining student performance, have enacted a variety of reforms in
recent years.6 Across America, leaders in education have striven to improve educa-
tional outcomes, which have lagged behind those of many developed nations.7 High-
poverty schools often have poor educational results: Only a small portion of students
attend college, many students drop out, and many schools function as what some
activists have dubbed the “school-to-prison pipeline.”8 To combat these schools’
dismal educational results, many reformers have challenged the status quo: uprooting
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1 See Eric R. Ebeling, Massachusetts Education Laws of 1642, 1647, and 1648, in HISTOR-
ICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 225, 225–26 (Richard J. Altenbaugh ed., 1999).
2 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425.
3 Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015).
4 Note, Education Policy Litigation as Devolution, 128 HARV. L. REV. 929, 929 (2015).
5 See id. at 950 (discussing contrasting opinions in the wake of Vergara v. State (Vergara I),
No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014), rev’d, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d
532 (Cal. Ct. App.), modified (May 3), review denied (Aug. 22, 2016)).
6 See Nicholas Kristof, Beyond Education Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2015, at A27 (de-
scribing reform efforts such as Teach for America, the Common Core curriculum, and
charter schools).
7 See Allie Bidwell, American Students Fall in International Academic Tests, Chinese
Lead the Pack, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 3, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com
/news/articles/2013/12/03/american-students-fall-in-international-academic-tests-chinese
-lead-the-pack [https://perma.cc/E6UG-EW8Z] (detailing that students from Hong Kong,
Shanghai, and Singapore outperformed Americans on the 2012 Programme for International
Student Assessment, an international test).
8 See School-To-Prison Pipeline, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org
/issues/juvenile-justice/school-prison-pipeline [https://perma.cc/LX3C-HH94].
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traditional school systems and replacing them with alternatives, such as charter
schools.9 Charter schools are privately managed and are typically non-union.10
However, they are still public schools, and therefore, they receive public funding
from the states.11 As charter schools have grown in popularity in recent years, estab-
lished structures of American K–12 public education, such as teacher tenure, have
come under fire.12 The recent California case Vergara v. State (Vergara I)13—in which
the trial court held that teacher tenure was unconstitutional—follows this trend.14
In Vergara, nine California public school students challenged five state teacher
tenure laws.15 Petitioners argued that teacher tenure statutes enabled dysfunction at
high-poverty schools by making it easy for ineffective teachers to gain tenure, and
making it difficult to fire them.16 Ineffective teachers, therefore, were kept in dispropor-
tionately low-income schools indefinitely and consequently denied students their
fundamental right to education.17 The trial court held that teacher tenure statutes were
indeed unconstitutional.18 Though the decision was ultimately reversed at the appellate
level,19 Vergara I has inspired copycat lawsuits in New York and elsewhere;
commentators have noted the potential ramifications of Vergara I nationwide.20
This Note will argue that charter schools, deemed an alternative to traditional
public school systems with teacher tenure, raise the same equal protection concerns
as teacher tenure statutes. Charter schools, many of which are located in urban, low-
income areas, have similar rates of inadequate student performance as public schools.21
These schools serve student populations comparable to those of the schools chal-
lenged in Vergara I & II, and yet, charter schools (in general) do not have teacher
9 See Kevin S. Huffman, Note, Charter Schools, Equal Protection Litigation, and the
New School Reform Movement, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1290, 1290–91 (1988).
10 See infra Section IV.A; see also CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, SURVEY OF AMERICA’S
CHARTER SCHOOLS 2014, at 13 (Ted Rebarber & Allison Consoletti Zaginer eds., 2014),
https://www.edreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/2014CharterSchoolSurveyFINAL
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KJG-TE3S].
11 See infra Section IV.A; see also The Charter School Alternative, WEEK (May 21, 2009),
http://theweek.com/articles/505341/charter-school-alternative [http://perma.cc/4AG7-ZGU9].
12 See Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher Tenure, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 75, 79 (2016) (describing how reformers, unable to make progress through the political
system, began the “War on Teacher Tenure” by using litigation to disrupt the status quo).
13 Vergara v. State (Vergara I), No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 27, 2014), rev’d, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. Ct. App.), modified (May 3), review
denied (Aug. 22, 2016).
14 Id. at *5.
15 Id. at *2.
16 Id.
17 Id. at *9.
18 Id.
19 Vergara v. State (Vergara II ), 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 558 (Cal. Ct. App.), modified
(May 3), review denied (Aug. 22, 2016).
20 See infra Section III.E.
21 See infra Part IV.
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tenure programs.22 Yet, charter schools produce student outcomes similar to those
of traditional public schools with low-quality tenured teachers.23
In Part I, this Note will explain the history of teacher tenure and the rationale
behind its initial development at the K–12 level.24 This Note will detail state courts’
equal protection and fundamental right analyses within the context of education in
Part II.25 Part III will outline the Vergara I & II courts’ rationales, exploring why the
trial court held California’s teacher tenure statutes as unconstitutional in the first
place, and why the appellate court’s reversal does not necessarily mean the California
teacher tenure statutes are constitutional as applied.26 Additionally, this Note will ad-
dress how commentators have characterized Vergara I.27 In Part IV, this Note will
describe how charter schools create the same equal protection concerns as the California
teacher tenure laws, and therefore, charters are not a viable alternative to tenure systems
in traditional public schools.28 Finally, in Part V, this Note will propose a solution
that will help lawmakers address the equal protection concerns present in California’s
teacher tenure statutes and in systems like it in other states: developing a longer pro-
bationary period before granting public school teachers tenure while simultaneously
incorporating a vetting process similar to those found in university tenure systems.29
I. BACKGROUND ON TEACHER TENURE
Tenure laws give teachers job protections and securities.30 As of 2008, 2.3
million teachers at public schools had tenure rights.31 The laws in place grant due
process rights to teachers who have shown they are qualified during a probationary
period.32 Teacher tenure exists at both the K–12 education level and the university
level, though the systems in place in universities have significant differences from
the K–12 teacher tenure systems.33 At the university level, the laws serve a similar
22 See CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, supra note 10, at 3.
23 See id.
24 See infra Part I.
25 See infra Part II.
26 See infra Part III.
27 See infra Section III.E.
28 See infra Part IV.
29 See infra Part V.
30 Richard D. Kahlenberg, Tenure: How Due Process Protects Teachers and Students, AM.
EDUCATOR, Summer 2015, at 4, 5, 7, http://www.etanews.org/DueProcess.pdf [https://perma.cc
/3738-DKZG] (noting, inter alia, that teacher tenure developed to shield teachers from “nepo-
tism” and to ensure that “arbitrary” administrative perspectives did not influence hiring and
firing decisions).
31 M.J. Stephey, A Brief History of Tenure, TIME (Nov. 17, 2008), http://content.time.com
/time/nation/article/0,8599,1859505,00.html [https://perma.cc/2BLM-LCTJ].
32 Kahlenberg, supra note 30, at 5.
33 See id. On average, most teachers at the K–12 level receive tenure after an average of
three years, whereas in universities, professors’ probationary period for permanent employ-
ment averages from seven to eight years. Id. at 5–6; see also infra Section V.C.
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function: Tenure ensures that professors have academic freedom and job security,
which in turn attracts talent to the profession.34 Essentially, once a teacher obtains
tenure, she gains the right to request an impartial hearing before being fired: due
process rights.35
Teacher tenure rights at the K–12 level originated in the late nineteenth century
and eventually developed into an established component of the K–12 educational
system.36 Before teacher tenure protections developed in Massachusetts, school
administrators in the state could fire female teachers if they married, got pregnant,
stayed out too late at night, or wore pants.37 New York established the first laws
detailing tenure protections for teachers in 1897.38 New Jersey developed similar
statutes in 1909.39 In part, states created teacher tenure statutes for K–12 public
educators to protect them from administrative firing decisions based on in-school
politics or arbitrary whims.40 In a world where many educators were female, the early
teacher tenure statutes ensured that teachers enjoyed job security in the face of rampant
sex discrimination.41 Sigrid Bathen notes that teacher tenure protections developed
in tandem with feminist movements to protect female teachers.42 Additionally, as
educating young children can be a thankless and grueling profession, teacher tenure
developed as an incentive to attract new talent and keep good teachers in schools.43
Modern teacher unions are, predictably, in support of current teacher tenure
laws.44 For example, New York’s statewide teacher union, New York State United
Teachers (NYSUT), details arguments in support of tenure on its website, calling
tenure “a safeguard that ensures teachers can speak up for what students need” and
explaining that tenure shields teachers from being fired unfairly.45 Additionally, the
California Teachers Association, which refers to teacher tenure laws as “due process
34 Ronald C. Brown, Tenure Rights in Contractual and Constitutional Context, 6 J.L. &
EDUC. 279, 279 (1977).
35 Kahlenberg, supra note 30, at 5.
36 Why Tenure Matters, NYSUT, http://www.nysut.org/resources/special-resources-sites
/tenure/why-tenure-matters [https://perma.cc/YYQ5-Q3X3].
37 Should Teachers Get Tenure?, PROCON.ORG, http://teachertenure.procon.org/ [https://
perma.cc/JKS6-EPX2].
38 Why Tenure Matters, supra note 36.
39 Kahlenberg, supra note 30, at 6.
40 Why Tenure Matters, supra note 36.
41 See Sigrid Bathen, Tackling the Teacher Tenure Issue, L.A. TIMES (May 20, 2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/20/opinion/oe-bathen20 [https://perma.cc/5UA8-GYKB]
(discussing the history of teacher tenure and its current surrounding controversy).
42 Id.
43 See Molly Robertson, Blaming Teacher Tenure Is Not the Answer, 44 J.L. & EDUC. 463,
467 (2015) (noting that there may be a shortage of qualified professionals to fill every school dis-
trict and that the job security of tenure will motivate talented individuals to take jobs in schools).
44 See Why Tenure Matters, supra note 36 (noting that the lawsuits challenging teacher
tenure statutes are funded by anti-union forces).
45 Id.
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rights,” asserts that teacher tenure is necessary to ensure that good teachers remain
in schools and are not subject to politicized hiring and firing decisions.46
However, in recent times, reformers have begun to question and challenge
teacher tenure.47 Critics of the laws assert that teacher tenure causes inefficiency and
makes it difficult for administrators to fire bad teachers.48 They claim that at a time
when schools are combatting budget decreases, inequalities between school districts,
and high student dropout rates, teacher tenure presents an obstacle to improving
public schools.49 Additionally, the wave of litigation attacking teacher tenure has
received prominent media attention.50 For example, media sources have reported that
one Silicon Valley mogul has created a nonprofit with the sole purpose of bringing
lawsuits challenging teacher tenure statutes in various states.51
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR EDUCATION
Although the U.S. Constitution does not protect citizens’ right to an education,52
all states guarantee the right to education in their respective constitutions.53 There-
fore, education enjoys constitutional protection at the state level.54
46 See CAL. TCHRS. ASS’N, EVALUATION: KEY TO EXCELLENCE 5 (2005), http://www.cta
.org/~/media/Documents/Issues%20%20Action/Teacher%20Quality/KeytoExcellence2005
.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20150411T1000032164 [http://perma.cc/NDE7-9542] (noting that due process
is necessary for teachers “who perform satisfactorily” because teachers employ a wide variety
of instructional methods, and these teachers facilitate good educational outcomes for students).
47 See, e.g., Vergara I, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27,
2014), rev’d, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. Ct. App.), modified (May 3), review denied (Aug. 22,
2016) (California trial court decision in which the court held teacher tenure laws to be
unconstitutional, discussed at length in Part III); Leslie Brody, Hearing Set on Challenge to
New York Teacher Tenure Law, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2015, 1:19 PM), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/hearing-set-on-challenge-to-new-york-teacher-tenure-law-1421113358 [https://perma
.cc/MH5C-CNLC] (describing a hearing in which teacher tenure laws were attacked).
48 Bathen, supra note 41.
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., Jennifer Medina, Judge Rejects Teacher Tenure, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2014,
at A1 (detailing the outcome of Vergara I); Haley Sweetland Edwards, The War on Teacher
Tenure, TIME (Oct. 23, 2014), http://time.com/3533556/the-war-on-teacher-tenure/ [https://
perma.cc/EBQ4-T2KZ] (describing Silicon Valley businessman David Welch’s litigation
activism against teacher tenure statutes).
51 See Edwards, supra note 50 (detailing David Welch’s nonprofit Students Matter);
STUDENTS MATTER, http://studentsmatter.org/ [https://perma.cc/J2H8-ZP5H].
52 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education, of
course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.”).
53 See Education Policy Litigation as Devolution, supra note 4, at 929.
54 Id.; see also, e.g., Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 948 (Cal. 1976) (noting
that education was a fundamental interest under California’s state constitution), cert. denied,
432 U.S. 907 (1977).
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Several states afford strong protections for education, holding out education as
a “fundamental right” to which all of its citizens are entitled.55 State-level concep-
tions of fundamental rights are based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which guarantees that all citizens enjoy rights that are considered
“fundamental.”56 In Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I),57 California—the state from which
Vergara I & II originate—first acknowledged that education was a “fundamental
interest” within the state.58 In states that recognize education as a fundamental interest,
courts must analyze laws that interfere with citizens’ right to education with “strict
scrutiny”: The state must prove that any law interfering with a fundamental right
serves a “compelling interest which justifies” its existence and that “the distinctions
drawn by the law are [n]ecessary to further its purpose.”59
Education can also receive protection through a state-level equal protection analy-
sis. These protections—and their resulting court analyses—also originate from the
U.S. Constitution. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, all groups—regardless of national
origin, race, or religious background—are entitled to “equal protection of the laws,”
including the enumerated rights laid out in the Constitution.60 This guarantee is known
as the Equal Protection Clause.61 Equal protection guarantees also exist at the state con-
stitutional level: Fifteen state constitutions have their own equal protection clauses,62
and many state constitutions contain equality provisions roughly analogous to equal
protection clauses.63 Therefore, each state constitution’s version or analogue of the
Equal Protection Clause guarantees rights to all citizens of those respective states.64
55 See, e.g., Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional
Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1333 (1992) (noting that California, West Virginia, and Connecti-
cut have held education to be a fundamental right). But see Huffman, supra note 9, at 1313
(noting many other states have held education to be a “basic” but “less than fundamental” right).
56 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (containing the Due Process Clause, out of which fun-
damental rights have been interpreted by the Court); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
155 (1973) (detailing that under the Constitution, courts must review state actions that violate
fundamental rights under strict scrutiny, and they must further a “compelling state interest”).
Note that education is not a fundamental interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.
57 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
58 Id. at 1244 (referring to education as a “fundamental interest”).
59 Id. at 1249.
60 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
61 Id.
62 ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 209 n.109 (2009)
(citations omitted); see also, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3(b)(4); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3(a).
63 WILLIAMS, supra note 62, at 209–10. Williams later goes on to explain that most state
constitutions guarantee civil rights and prohibit sex discrimination. Id. at 210; see also, e.g.,
Civil Remedies and Procedure: Certain Incidents of Trial, Constitution of Virginia: Bill of
Rights—Legislature, 2000 WL 33187319, *1 n.1 (Va. A.G. Apr. 13, 2000) (Attorney General
Mark L. Earley explains to the Honorable J. R. Zepkin that the Virginia Constitution contains an
antidiscrimination clause in Article I, § 11 and a bar on “special legislation in Article IV,
§ 14” that effectively functions as a state-level analogue to the federal Equal Protection Clause).
64 Furthermore, when dealing with equality violations, state courts typically utilize an equal
protection analysis based on the federal courts’ interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.
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If a certain class is denied their right to education, courts follow a specific analysis
under their respective state constitutions.65 The California Supreme Court explained
this framework in the Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II ) case.66 In Serrano II, the court
utilized the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach67 to scrutinize laws disproportionately
affecting a “suspect classification.”68 Similar to a fundamental interest analysis, laws
interfering with a suspect class’s rights are also subject to strict scrutiny.69
Courts can analyze any law that interferes with the right to education through
an equal protection analysis or a fundamental right analysis.70 In an equal protection
analysis, the courts must first establish that the challenged education law specifically
harms a suspect class.71 Courts may identify the impact to suspect classes by looking
at statistics or data.72 Second, if the courts find that the law interferes with a suspect
class’s rights, the law must survive “strict scrutiny” in order to maintain viability.73 In
other words, the law must be “narrowly tailored” to serve a “compelling interest” in
order to survive the analysis.74 If no such compelling interest can be found, then the
WILLIAMS, supra note 62, at 209–10; see also Darces v. Woods, 679 P.2d 458, 472 (Cal.
1984) (noting that state equal protection clauses could function independently of the federal
Fourteenth Amendment).
65 See Vergara I, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *1, *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27,
2014), rev’d, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. Ct. App.), modified (May 3), review denied (Aug. 22,
2016) (citing Serrano II, 557 P.2d 929, 948 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977))
(“Under the strict scrutiny standard applied in such (suspect classifications or fundamental
interests) cases, the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a compelling
interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to
further its purpose.”(citation omitted)).
66 557 P.2d 929, 948 (Cal. 1976).
67 See 13 CAL. JUR. 3d CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 339, Westlaw (database updated Nov.
2016) (noting that because the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and the California
Constitution’s equal protection clause both establish similar rights, the courts generally apply
the federal framework in the state constitutional equal protection analysis).
68 Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 948 (citing Serrano I, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Cal. 1971)). Note that
in California, suspect classes can include groups of a particular socioeconomic level. See Butt
v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1249 (Cal. 1992); see also Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 948 (minorities as
a suspect class).
69 See Butt, 842 P.2d at 1249 (“[W]here fundamental rights or suspect classifications are
at stake, a state’s general freedom to discriminate on a geographical basis will be signifi-
cantly curtailed by the equal protection clause.” (citations omitted)).
70 See WILLIAMS, supra note 62, at 208.
71 See Vergara I, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27,
2014), rev’d, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. Ct. App.), modified (May 3), review denied (Aug. 22,
2016) (citing statistics to establish that the challenged laws disproportionately denied minority
groups and people in poverty their fundamental rights to an education).
72 Id.
73 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; WILLIAMS, supra note 62, at 214; see also Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
74 See Serrano II, 557 P.2d 929, 948 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977)
(stating that the state has the burden of proof in this analysis).
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law violates the state’s constitutional equivalent of the Equal Protection Clause.75
Additionally, in states that consider education to be a fundamental right—including
California, West Virginia, and Connecticut—the courts can also use a strict scrutiny
analysis when dealing with laws that limit educational opportunity.76 Therefore, if
a state’s laws interfere with a suspect class’s right to education, or in cases where
education is a fundamental right, the courts would apply a strict scrutiny analysis to
see if the challenged laws hold water.77
Because education is a fundamental right in California, and the challenged
teacher tenure statutes also raised equal protection issues, the trial court in Vergara I
applied a strict scrutiny analysis to California’s teacher tenure laws.78
III. VERGARA V. STATE: OVERVIEW AND CHARACTERIZATIONS OF COMMENTATORS
A. Fact Summary
In Vergara I & II, the plaintiffs were nine California public school students rep-
resented by guardians ad litem.79 They attended low-income schools.80 These petitioners
brought challenges against five California statutes: the “Permanent Employment
Statute,”81 the “Dismissal Statutes,”82 and the three laws comprising the “Last-In-
First-Out (LIFO)” statutes.83 Petitioners argued that these challenged statutes created
the unconstitutional teacher tenure infrastructure at their low-income public schools.
Essentially, the “Permanent Employment Statute” enabled potentially unqualified
teachers to gain tenure after an insufficient probationary period, and the “Dismissal
Statutes” and the “Last-In-First-Out” statutes fostered a system that kept these “grossly
ineffective” teachers in the schools.84 First, petitioners argued that these “grossly in-
effective” teachers harmed California students “in general.”85 Additionally, petitioners
75 Once it is found that a law affects a “suspect class” and is subject to strict scrutiny, few
laws have survived the analysis. See, e.g., Woods v. Horton, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332, 350 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2008) (in which state statute that did not survive strict scrutiny was reformed to
conform with equal protection standards). But see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 219 (1944) (in which Japanese internment during World War II survived strict scrutiny,
despite modern criticism of the decision).
76 Hubsch, supra note 55, at 125.
77 Id.
78 Vergara I, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014),
rev’d, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. Ct. App.), modified (May 3), review denied (Aug. 22, 2016).
79 Id. at *2.
80 Id.
81 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44929.21(b) (West 1987).
82 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44934 (West 2015); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44938(b)(1)–(2) (West
1995); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44944 (West 2016).
83 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955 (West 1983).
84 Vergara I, 2014 WL 6478415, at *2.
85 Id. at *9.
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claimed that the inadequate teachers were disproportionately present in low-income
school systems and interfered with these students’ fundamental interest in education.86
Therefore, they claimed that low-income students were getting unequal educations
(because they had more “grossly ineffective teachers” within their schools) than
middle- and high-income students, who attended schools that had fewer “grossly
ineffective teachers.”87 Thus, plaintiffs claimed that the teacher tenure statutes violated
the equal protection clause of California’s constitution.88
B. Trial Court’s Holding and Analysis
According to the California Constitution’s equal protection clause, “[a] person
may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied
equal protection of the laws.”89 First, the trial court laid out the provisions of the
California Constitution that established California’s duty to maintain educational sys-
tems for its citizens.90 Then, the trial court noted state cases had already established
education as a fundamental interest. In Serrano I & II, California courts held that
education was a fundamental interest.91 Additionally, Butt v. State92 further reiterated
children’s rights to education in California, ruling that closing schools early because
of budgeting concerns denied students their fundamental right to education.93 The
court in Vergara I consequently interpreted these cases as establishing the right to
education as a fundamental interest.94
After establishing the precedent of education as a fundamental interest in Cali-
fornia, the trial court then addressed how grossly ineffective teachers denied students
their fundamental right to education and disproportionately hurt low-income students
by citing statistical evidence.95 First, the trial court referenced the detrimental effects
of grossly ineffective teachers, citing a study in Los Angeles Public Schools, finding
86 Id. at *3.
87 Id.
88 Id.; see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (containing the California Constitution’s due process
and equal protection clauses).
89 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
90 CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being es-
sential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage
by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual [and] scientific . . . improvement.”); CAL.
CONST. art. IX, § 5 (“The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by which
a free school shall be kept up and supported in each district . . . .”).
91 Serrano II, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Serrano
I, 487 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Cal. 1971).
92 842 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1992).
93 Id. at 1252–53.
94 Vergara I, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *1, *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014),
rev’d, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. Ct. App.), modified (May 3), review denied (Aug. 22, 2016).
95 Id. at *4–7.
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that students taught by teachers in the fifth percentile of competence “los[t] 9.54
months of learning in a single year” as compared to students taught by “average
teachers.”96 The court then cited additional statistics to demonstrate that grossly
ineffective teachers were actively present in numerous classrooms across California.97
Therefore, the trial court established that grossly ineffective teachers could have a
catastrophic and detrimental effect on students’ education.98
After determining the danger of grossly ineffective teachers, the trial court then
explained that the challenged statutes allowed these grossly ineffective teachers into
the system.99 The trial court explained that the statutes challenged in the lawsuit (1) in-
terfered with students’ fundamental right to education and (2) disproportionately
affected poor and minority students.100 In determining that grossly ineffective teachers
hurt poor and minority students disproportionately, the court cited a report from the
California Department of Education.101
Finally, the trial court applied the strict scrutiny standard to each of the challenged
statutes.102 The Permanent Employment Statute, the court concluded, did not provide
enough time for teachers to be evaluated properly.103 The trial court compared Califor-
nia’s tenure probationary period with those of other states to illustrate its insufficient
assessment time.104 It noted that California’s probationary period for evaluating whether
teachers should be awarded tenure—under two years105—was, in fact, shorter than
the vast majority of most states (three or more years).106 Comparing California’s Per-
manent Employment Statute to the relevant laws of other states, the trial court found
no justification for their provisions to satisfy strict scrutiny.107 Accordingly, the court
held that the Permanent Employment Statute failed strict scrutiny.108
96 Id. at *4.
97 Id. (“[A]n expert . . . testified that 1–3% of teachers . . . are grossly ineffective. . . .
[T]he extrapolated number of grossly ineffective teachers ranges from 2,750 to 8,250 [in
California].”).
98 Id.
99 Id. at *5–7.
100 Id. at *4.
101 Id. at *7.
102 Id. at *4–7.
103 Id. at *5.
104 See id. at *4–5. The court noted that while “32 states have three[-]year period[s]” for
evaluating teachers before awarding them tenure, and nine states have four- to five-year pro-
bationary periods for new teachers, California is among only five states that have probationary
periods for new teachers of two or fewer years. Id. at *5.
105 Id. at *4–5. Because teachers would find out if they had received tenure by March 15
of their second year, the two-year probationary period, in effect, was shortened by two to
three months. Id. at *4.
106 Id. at *5.
107 Id.
108 Id.
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The trial court then applied a strict scrutiny standard to the Dismissal Statutes.109
The Dismissal Statutes described the termination process for tenured personnel.110
The plaintiffs argued that the dismissal process, as outlined by the statutes, was too
inefficient, allowing grossly ineffective teachers to remain in the system because it
was expensive and time-consuming for schools to fire them.111 In scrutinizing the
statutes, the trial court noted that teachers had due process rights in tenure, but that
these rights did not outweigh the children’s fundamental interest in education.112
According to the trial court, the state did not meet its burden to prove that inefficient
Dismissal Statutes were necessary to serve the state’s interest in maintaining due
process rights for tenured teachers.113 Therefore, the Dismissal Statutes did not sur-
vive strict scrutiny.114
Finally, the trial court analyzed the “Last-In-First-Out” Statutes under strict
scrutiny.115 The trial court noted that these statutes kept grossly ineffective teachers in
the public school system, as they required that the most recently hired teacher be the
first one to be fired during layoffs, regardless of ability.116 The trial court noted that the
Last-In-First-Out Statutes “separat[ed] . . . students from competent teachers” and,
furthermore, that there was no compelling justification to support the statutes’ exis-
tence.117 Therefore, the “Last-In-First-Out” Statutes did not survive strict scrutiny.118
In Vergara I, the trial court held that all five of the challenged teacher tenure statutes
were unconstitutional under the California Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.119
The Governor of California appealed the case on August 29, 2014, and oral
arguments for this appeal took place on February 25, 2016.120 The respondents’ brief
noted that the trial court had used the correct standard of review—strict scrutiny—
for assessing the challenged tenure statutes because they made a “real and appreciable
109 Id. at *5–6.
110 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44934 (West 2015); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44938(b)(1)–(2) (West
1995); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44944 (West 2016).
111 Vergara I, 2014 WL 6478415, at *5 (explaining that the process to fire a grossly
ineffective teacher with tenure could last between two and ten years and could cost “$50,000
to $450,000 or more”).
112 See id. at *6; see also Skelly v. State Pers. Bd., 539 P.2d 774, 788–89 (Cal. 1975) (estab-
lishing due process hearing rights for tenured employees).
113 Vergara I, 2014 WL 6478415, at *6.
114 Id.
115 Id. at *6–7; see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955 (West 1983).
116 Vergara I, 2014 WL 6478415, at *6.
117 Id.
118 Id. at *7.
119 Id.
120 See Perry A. Zirkel, Vergara v. State of California: Judicial Abolition of Teacher Tenure?,
20 PUB. INT. L. REP. 57, 61 (2014) (noting that the appeal could take “years”); Vergara v. State
of California, CAL. TCHRS. ASS’N, http://www.cta.org/vergara [https://perma.cc/2AQN-D3BX]
[hereinafter CAL. TCHRS. ASS’N] (providing up-to-date coverage of the Vergara decision
from the perspective of the California Teachers Association).
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impact on” students’ fundamental rights.121 The brief also argued that the statutes
disproportionately affected poor and minority students,122 and later went on to support
the validity of the respondents’ standing.123
C. Though the California Court of Appeal Reversed Vergara I, It Limited Its
Judgment to Facial Grounds
The California Court of Appeal ultimately overturned Vergara I on “facial”
grounds, and the California Supreme Court declined to review the appellate decision.124
First, the court characterized the narrow nature of its holding, noting that it was lim-
ited to determining whether the teacher tenure statutes were unconstitutional on their
face, “not [in their] application to the particular circumstances of an individual.”125
According to the court, the tenure statutes would be “facially unconstitutional” if the
“constitutional violation flow[ed] ‘inevitably’ from” them.126 The appellate court held
that the challenged statutes did not violate equal protection because (1) the petitioners
did not demonstrate that the teacher tenure statutes had inevitably led to dispropor-
tionate amounts of poor and minority students receiving a worse education than other
students, and (2) the “unlucky” students in general (those who had grossly ineffec-
tive teachers) did not constitute a specific class under which equal protection could
be claimed.127 The decision additionally explained that because education adminis-
trators made hiring and firing decisions, they allowed ineffective teachers to receive
tenure, not the statutes themselves.128
However, the Court of Appeal’s judgment was limited to establishing that the
challenged statutes did not facially violate equal protection.129 The court never
determined that the teacher tenure statutes were constitutional “as applied.”130 In the
decision, the court distinguished an “as applied” constitutional challenge as follows:
“[A]n ‘as applied’ constitutional challenge seeks ‘relief from a specific application
121 Respondents’ Brief at 67, Vergara v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016)
(No. B258589).
122 Id. at 95, 99.
123 Id. at 113–16.
124 Vergara II, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 536, 550, 558 (Cal. Ct. App.), modified (May 3),
review denied (Aug. 22, 2016) (“Both plaintiffs and defendants characterize this case—which
seeks to enjoin any enforcement of the tenure, dismissal, and reduction-in-force statutes—as
a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the subject statutes.”).
125 Id. at 550 (citations omitted).
126 Id. at 555 (citations omitted).
127 Id. at 551–53.
128 Id. at 556 (“[S]ince the challenged statutes, on their face and in effect, do not dictate where
teachers are assigned, declaring the statutes facially unconstitutional would not prevent adminis-
trators from assigning the worst teachers to schools serving poor and minority students.”).
129 Id. at 538.
130 See id. at 550 (contrasting a facial constitutional attack with an “as applied” constitu-
tional attack).
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of a facially valid statute or ordinance,’ or an injunction against future application of
the statute or ordinance in the manner in which it has previously been applied.”131 The
decision also noted that the plaintiffs had not addressed how the statutes applied to
specific, individual schools in their complaint.132 Therefore, California’s facially valid
teacher tenure statutes nonetheless may still violate equal protection or interfere with
students’ fundamental right to education under an “as applied” constitutional analysis.133
Additionally, the dissenting judges in the Vergara II appellate decision empha-
sized that the court should have applied a strict scrutiny analysis because the statutes
denied certain students their fundamental right to education.134 Justice Liu noted that
when a law denies any group of students their right to education, the challenged law
deserves a strict scrutiny analysis.135 He later noted that the plaintiffs’ proffered
statistical evidence established that the laws imposed an “appreciable” burden on
students’ right to education.136 In addition, Justice Cuéllar argued that education’s status
as a fundamental right warranted strict scrutiny review of the challenged statutes.137
D. Continued Relevance of the Vergara I Trial Court’s Holding in Other States
In addition to the potential “as applied” unconstitutionality of the teacher tenure
statutes, the trial court’s analysis is still relevant because of the numerous copycat
lawsuits filed around the country.138 State courts nationwide may employ a similar
equal protection analysis under their respective state constitutions. Connecticut and
West Virginia courts have affirmatively determined that education is a fundamental
right in their states,139 so these courts may apply the Vergara trial court’s fundamen-
tal interest analysis if similar challenges are made in those states against tenure
131 See id. (emphasis added) (quoting Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1152
(Cal. 1995)).
132 See id. at 551 (“Plaintiffs did not attempt to establish that the statutes were applied un-
constitutionally to a particular person, the type of challenge made in an as-applied case. . . .
Instead, plaintiffs’ challenge ‘sought to enjoin any application of the [statutes] to any person
in any circumstance.’” (quoting Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1154)).
133 See, e.g., Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1152 (describing an “as applied” constitutional challenge
and its corresponding remedies).
134 See generally Vergara II, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 559–64 (Liu, J., dissenting); id. at
564–70 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 560 (Liu, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 562 (“There is considerable evidence in the record to support the trial court’s
conclusion that the hiring and retention of a substantial number of grossly ineffective teach-
ers in California public schools have an appreciable impact on students’ fundamental right
to education.”).
137 See id. at 564 (Cuéllar, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in California’s Constitution or any other
law supports the Court of Appeal’s reasoning. When a fundamental right [such as education]
has been appreciably burdened, we apply strict scrutiny.” (citations omitted)).
138 See infra Section III.E.
139 Hubsch, supra note 55, at 125.
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statutes.140 Additionally, challenged teacher statutes in other states could be subject
to equal protection analyses if plaintiffs argue that K–12 teacher tenure statutes
disproportionately affect a suspect class.141
E. Commentator Reactions to Vergara I
Commentators have expressed varying reactions to the Vergara I trial decision.
Some have noted that the case will affect teacher tenure statutes in other states; for
example, as mentioned in the introduction, Vergara I has spawned a variety of
copycat cases.142 A New York Times article noted that the Silicon Valley–funded
nonprofit, Students Matter, had the goal of bringing similar tenure-challenging liti-
gation elsewhere.143 Students Matter has considered filing lawsuits attacking teacher
tenure similar to Vergara I in New York, Connecticut, New Mexico, Oregon, Kansas,
and other states.144 Other individuals have praised the trial-level Vergara I decision.145
For example, former Secretary of Education Arne Duncan lauded the Vergara I trial
court holding as a way to provide better educational outcomes.146
Other groups have condemned the trial decision.147 For example, teacher unions
have been predictably critical of Vergara I’s trial holding, warning that the decision
will hurt teachers and, consequently, negatively impact children.148 The American
140 See Vergara I, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014), rev’d,
209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. Ct. App.), modified (May 3), review denied (Aug. 22, 2016). See
generally Vergara II, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 560 (Liu, J., dissenting) (explaining that laws that
interfere with the fundamental right to education warrant strict scrutiny analysis).
141 See Vergara I, 2014 WL 6478415, at *1.
142 See, e.g., Verified Class Action Complaint at 1–2, 8, Davids v. State, 2014 WL 3374692
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 30, 2014) (No. 101105) (an anti-tenure lawsuit filed by the New York City
Parents Union); see also Javier C. Hernández, Educators Fight Back on Attacks to Tenure,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2014, at A24 (explaining that Davids is one of two tenure-challenging
lawsuits “modeled” on Vergara I in New York).
143  See Medina, supra note 50, at A1, A15 (noting that David Welch’s nonprofit Students
Matter is considering filing lawsuits in “states with powerful unions where legislatures have
defeated attempts to change teacher tenure laws”); see also Edwards, supra note 50 (detailing
Students Matter).




148 See, e.g., CAL. TCHRS. ASS’N, supra note 120 (explaining that abolishing tenure will make
it more difficult to retain qualified teaching personnel); NYSUT Media Relations, California
Decision “Meritless” Assault on Workers’ Rights, NYSUT (June 11, 2014), http://www.nysut
.org/news/2014/june/nysut-california-decision-meritless-assault-on-workers-rights [https://perma
.cc/LR8V-QBDX] (“[T]enure laws like those in California, New York and other states benefit
students and help ensure good teaching. . . . The disturbing trend in America today, supported
by billionaires like the Walton family and the Koch brothers, is to take away union protections
and the employment rights of all working people. They want a low-paid compliant workforce
that can be fired at will. Teachers are their current target.”).
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Federation of Teachers remarked that the Vergara I decision was a “sad day for public
education[.]”149 Additionally, in a proposed amicus brief for the California Teachers
Association, various education-related unions in California argued that eliminating
these teacher tenure laws will make recruiting teachers more difficult.150 The brief
also asserted that teacher tenure decisions are political questions that should be kept
out of the courtroom and remain subject to legislature decision-making, and that “it
is not clear what due-process protections and judicial standards of review will apply in
the vacuum left by [this] decision.”151 Other scholarly critics have also echoed these
concerns, noting that Vergara I could have a potential ripple effect across the country.152
Finally, some commentators have argued that the effects of Vergara I will be
limited. In light of the California Court of Appeal’s reversal and the California Supreme
Court’s decision declining to review the appellate decision,153 such an assessment
certainly seems possible. One scholar noted that “the Vergara decision is more sig-
nificant symbolically than legally. . . . [T]he trial court’s decision serves as not only
a stimulus for ‘rebalancing’ tenure to its original meaning of reasonable and fair
procedural due process but also a reminder of the overriding need for more . . .
reform.”154 Another commentator criticized the decision for relying on statistics
about teachers instead of analyzing the numerous other factors relevant to producing
quality educational outcomes for students.155
Regardless of Vergara I’s legal impact on teacher tenure laws and regulations,
it has heightened the possibility that teacher tenure statutes may raise equal protec-
tion and due process concerns. Therefore, lawmakers must ensure that their school
systems provide all students with an appropriate education. Some reformers have
suggested charter schools—which are more autonomous and do not generally have
tenure programs—as an alternative to traditional public schools.156 However, as this
149 See M. Rebecca Cooper, Alaska and Vergara v. California: Evaluating the Constitu-
tionality of Teacher Tenure in Alaska, 32 ALASKA L. REV. 395, 396 (2015).
150 See Proposed Brief for Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. and Mun. Emps., et al. as Amici Curiae




151 See id. at 5, 7–8.
152 See Cooper, supra note 149, at 396–97 (describing how Vergara may influence teacher
tenure statutes in Alaska); Robertson, supra note 43, at 469–71 (explaining that if legislatures
invalidate teacher tenure statutes, quality teachers with talent will no longer be interested in
working in the field, and therefore, children will suffer from the resulting brain drain).
153 See Vergara II, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 558 (Cal. Ct. App.), modified (May 3), review
denied (Aug. 22, 2016).
154 Zirkel, supra note 120, at 70.
155 See Robertson, supra note 43, at 471; see also Michele Aronson, The Deceptive Promise
of Vergara: Why Teacher Tenure Lawsuits Will Not Improve Student Achievement, 37 CARDOZO
L. REV. 393, 396 (2015).
156 See, e.g., Lewis Solomon & Mary Gifford , Teacher Accountability in Charter Schools,
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Note will discuss at length in Part IV, the potential charter school “solution” inevita-
bly raises many of the same concerns as teacher tenure.157
IV. CHARTER SCHOOLS RAISE THE SAME EQUAL PROTECTION CONCERNS
AS TEACHER TENURE STATUTES. THEREFORE, THEY ARE NOT A
VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO TEACHER TENURE
In Vergara I, the trial court relied on an equal protection analysis in holding that
teacher tenure statutes deny low-income and minority students their fundamental
right to an education.158 Locally managed charter schools are sometimes touted as
superior alternatives to traditional public school systems with teacher tenure.159
Charter schools do not generally have teacher tenure systems in place.160 With many
charters located in low-income, inner-city areas, these schools serve similar popula-
tions of students as the schools discussed in Vergara I & II.161 However, because the
educational outcomes of numerous charter schools are lacking, charters raise the
same equal protection issues as the challenged teacher tenure statutes; therefore,
they are not actually viable alternate options.162
NAT’L CTR. FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS (Mar. 1, 1999), http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba285 [https://
perma.cc/LWH3-FQ3X].
157 See infra Part IV.
158 See Vergara I, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27,
2014), rev’d, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 558 (Cal. Ct. App.), modified (May 3), review denied
(Aug. 22, 2016).
159 See The Charter School Alternative, supra note 11 (noting that charters are not subject
to the same regulations as traditional systems and that some charter school networks have
excelled despite receiving twenty-two percent less funding than traditional public schools);
Solomon & Gifford, supra note 156.
160 For the most part, charter schools are union-free institutions; ninety-three percent of
charter schools were non-union in 2012. See CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, supra note 10, at 13.
But see, e.g., Charter School Chapters, UNITED FED’N TCHRS., http://www.uft.org/chapters
/charter-schools [https://perma.cc/L56Y-FHMG] (highlighting that twenty-two New York
City charter schools are part of the United Federation of Teachers, New York City’s teachers’
union); N.Y.C. CHARTER SCH. CTR., http://www.nyccharterschools.org/ [https://perma.cc
/CF5K-R47U] (noting there are 216 charter schools in New York City, meaning about ten
percent of charter schools in New York City are unionized).
161 See infra Section IV.C.
162 Other scholars have touched upon this idea, but none have yet explored it both in depth
and post–Vergara I & II. See, e.g., Kevin G. Welner, Silver Linings Casebook: How Vergara’s
Backers May Lose by Winning, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 121, 140
(2015) (“Similar research-based scrutiny could be repeated for a wide array of other policies
and practices, including in suits grounded in very different claims about teacher quality. Using
[the Vergara I court’s] reasoning, imagine a lawsuit by students in a place like Los Angeles or
New Orleans challenging laws that allow charter schools to hire inexperienced, un-credentialed
teachers. Such plaintiffs would have little difficulty mustering at least the same degree of evi-
dence as the Vergara plaintiffs to support such a challenge.”). See generally Huffman, supra
note 9 (describing charter school equal protection claims, but in a pre–Vergara I & II context).
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A. Background on Charter Schools
Charter schools are publically funded, K–12 institutions that function mostly
independently of state and local regulation.163 For charter schools to exist, states
must pass enabling statutes.164 Most states have charter systems, as forty-two states
have enabling statutes that authorize charters.165 Assuming these laws are in place,
groups of individuals or people acting on their own can apply to plan, develop, and
operate a charter school.166 Going forward, the charter school can run and operate;
then, administrators receive funding in support of their school’s operation.167 Gener-
ally, charter administrators can make their own choices regarding the design, faculty,
and budget allocation of their schools.168
Numerous charter schools have spread in low-income, urban areas. In Washing-
ton, D.C., charter schools make up roughly forty-four percent of the public schools
in that district.169 Another example is New Orleans.170 After Hurricane Katrina literally
destroyed the city’s public school system in 2005, a network of charter schools
emerged as a way to cultivate innovation.171 Now, charter schools compose nearly
all of the publicly funded schools in New Orleans.172
Because charters are individually managed, the schools vary widely in terms of
their performance—each charter school may only be as good as the specific manage-
ment at each individual school. It should be noted that many charter schools have
enjoyed widespread success.173 Programs such as the Knowledge Is Power Program
(KIPP)174 and the IDEA Academy network of charter schools175 have had positive
163 Huffman, supra note 9, at 1294.
164 See Education Policy Litigation as Devolution, supra note 4, at 948.
165 See id.
166 See Huffman, supra note 9, at 1294.
167 See id.
168 See id.
169 FRIENDS CHOICE URBAN SCH., http://www.focusdc.org/charter-facts [https://perma.cc
/T6YA-CV92].
170 See, e.g., Andrea Gabor, The Myth of the New Orleans School Makeover, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 2015, at SR3.
171 See id.
172 See id. (“After Katrina, the district eventually took over about 60 local schools; about
20 well-performing schools remained in the Orleans Parish School Board, creating, in essence,
a two-tier system. Nearly all the schools in both parts of the system have since been con-
verted to charters.”).
173  See The Charter School Alternative, supra note 11 (noting that “some charter schools
truly do excel. Students at KIPP schools . . . for instance, generally achieve far superior test
scores”).
174 See Editorial, Charters in the Crosshairs, CHI. TRIBUNE (Oct. 26, 2015, 6:40 PM), http://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-chicago-charter-schools-edit-1027-2015
1026-story.html [https://perma.cc/QWY3-4K5P] (noting that KIPP, the Knowledge Is Power
Program charter school network, has enjoyed strong academic performance).
175 See Search Best High Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://www.usnews.com
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educational outcomes for students in low-income areas. However, numerous charter
schools across the country suffer from lackluster performance.176 Therefore, these
low-achieving institutions deny their students equal access to education. Furthermore,
when charters disproportionately impact minority or low-income students, or when
they infringe upon educational outcomes in states where education is a fundamental
interest, charter-enabling statutes can raise state constitutional equal protection con-
cerns similar to the issues that teacher tenure statutes raise in Vergara.177
B. The Performance of Numerous Charter Schools Is Lacking
Though reformers have touted charter schools as a grand improvement over
traditional school systems, these institutions do not exhibit better outcomes univer-
sally. First of all, researchers find charter schools difficult to study due to “the
constant flux of schools and students.”178 Additionally, charter schools are only as
good as their individual administrators, so they can be challenging to study in the
aggregate. When looking at aggregate charter school performance, however, studies
have found that traditional public school systems outperform many charter schools.179
In addition, while Stanford University’s Center for Research on Education Outcomes
(CREDO) 2015 Urban Charter School Study noted that in high-poverty, urban areas,
many charters outperformed traditional public schools, the schools did not have a
universally beneficial impact.180 In numerous low-income areas, children performed
worse in the charters than in the traditional public school systems.181
/education/best-high-schools/search?charter=truestate-urlname=texas [https://perma.cc/QMV9
-Y7TE]. Four IDEA high schools rank within the top thirty-one of Texas high schools.
176 See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, A Dozen Problems with Charter Schools, WASH. POST
(May 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2014/05/20/a-dozen
-problems-with-charter-schools/?utm_team=.eca3826e4255 [https://perma.cc/2KNN-XQC6]
(noting that Pennsylvania charters fared worse than the state’s traditional schools in terms
of performance).
177 See Welner, supra note 162, at 140.
178 Huffman, supra note 9, at 1298.
179 See Charter Schools: Finding Out the Facts: At a Glance, CTR. FOR PUB. EDUC., http://
www.centerforpubliceducation.org/Main-Menu/Organizing-a-school/Charter-schools
-Finding-out-the-facts-At-a-glance [https://perma.cc/R5WD-U8JB] [hereinafter Charter Schools]
(“Some charters do better; the majority do the same or worse. . . . [A study by the Center for
Research on Education Outcomes] found that while some charter schools do better than the
traditional public schools that fed them, the majority do the same or worse. Almost one-fifth
of charters (17 percent) performed significantly better . . . than the traditional public school.
However, an even larger group of charters (37 percent) performed significantly worse in terms
of reading and math. The remainder (46 percent) did not do significantly better or worse.”).
180 See CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, URBAN CHARTER SCHOOL STUDY:
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Poverty rates of urban charter schools in the CREDO study ranged from 11%
(Las Vegas) to 93% (Chicago).182 In Fort Worth, with 44% of its charter school student
population in poverty, academic growth in reading and math was lower than that of
traditional public schools.183 Additionally, in Fort Myers (with 35% of students in
poverty), Mesa (with 41% of students in poverty), and West Palm Beach (with 72%
of students in poverty), charter school students had lower levels of annual growth
in math and reading as compared to the general student population in these cities’
respective states.184 The CREDO study went on to analyze the results of these schools,
noting that these charter sectors had to increase the academic growth levels of their
students; otherwise these children would fall behind their non-charter peers.185
Furthermore, according to a University of Minnesota Law School study,186 many
charter schools are performing no better than traditional public schools, the unionized
systems challenged by some education reformers.187 In an article for the Washington
Post, one commentator also referenced the University of Minnesota Law School
charter school study and expressed that the study vindicated the theory that charter
school students do no better than traditional public school students.188
New Orleans’s charter school experiment has also produced dismal academic
outcomes.189 The system provides a good case study due to the lack of traditional
public schools there—92% of New Orleans students attended charters in fall 2014.190
The public school system, which includes charters, serves a predominately minority,
low-income population: In 2014–2015, 87% of students were African American,
and 84% were considered to be “economically disadvantaged.”191 Even though the
performance of students has seemingly increased,192 Louisiana state testing standards
182 Id. at 6.
183 See id. at 6, 16.
184 See id. at 6–7, 16.
185 See id. at 16.
186 INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, U. MINN. L. SCH., CHARTER SCHOOLS IN CHICAGO:
NO MODEL FOR EDUCATION REFORM (2014), https://www.law.umn.edu/sites/law.umn.edu
/files/newsfiles/8a690b58/Chicago-Charters-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E3V-P7RQ].
187  IMO Study Shows Chicago Charter Schools Underperform Their Traditional Counter-
parts, U. MINN. L. SCH. (Oct. 13, 2014), https://www.law.umn.edu/news/2014-10-13-imo
-study-shows-chicago-charter-schools-underperform-their-traditional-counterparts [https://
perma.cc/5TVX-7EPD] [hereinafter IMO Study].
188 Strauss, supra note 176.
189 Gabor, supra note 170.





192 Gabor, supra note 170 (“Last year, 63 percent of children in local elementary and middle
schools were proficient on state tests, up from 37 percent in 2005.”).
1170 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:1151
are very low compared to other states.193 Additionally, research that claimed that the
New Orleans charters had improved student performance did not include high
school performance data, which is often directly correlated with successful outcomes
in college and beyond.194 The school district most affected by Hurricane Katrina—
with the most charters—had an ACT score dramatically below what was required
for entry to a four-year public college.195 Finally, some commentators have noted
that very disadvantaged children may fall outside the scope of research; therefore,
studies may fail to factor these children into performance data that supposedly demon-
strate improvement.196
C. Many Charter Schools Disproportionately Affect the Educational Outcomes of
Minority Students
Many local charter schools disproportionately enroll—and negatively impact—
minorities.197 Specific data pulled from various research support this conclusion.198
For example, according to a study at the University of Minnesota Law School, Chicago
charter schools are more racially segregated than the city’s traditional public schools
and also have worse academic outcomes.199 Additionally, New Orleans charter schools
predominately enroll African-American students and, as noted in Section IV.B, are
underperforming.200
The University of Minnesota Law School also noted that numerous charters are
more likely to enroll students of one particular race.201 The study highlighted that 7%
of charters demonstrated ethnic diversity (“in the form of schools with mixed black
and Latino student populations”) as opposed to 20% of traditional public schools.202
D. Charter Schools May Fail Under an Equal Protection Analysis
First, because of charter schools’ overall range of performance, it is more likely
that individual charter schools or districts suffer from equal protection concerns over
charter schools in the aggregate.203
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 See id. (noting Recovery School District’s average ACT score in 2014 was 16.4).
196 Id.
197 See, e.g., IMO Study, supra note 187.
198 See id.
199 Id.
200 See LA. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 190; see also Gabor, supra note 170.
201 IMO Study, supra note 187.
202 Id.
203 See generally Huffman, supra note 9.
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As noted, states may consider the right to education a fundamental interest,204
whereas the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly held that education is not a fundamental
interest at the federal level.205 Accordingly, if plaintiffs bring an equal protection
claim that charter school statutes deny students the right to education, they are more
likely to succeed at the state constitutional level. According to one commentator, state
courts have been more inclined to use state constitutions to reform education than
on Fourteenth Amendment grounds.206 Aspiring plaintiffs could argue that the lacklus-
ter performance of certain charter schools “impose[s] a real and appreciable impact”207
on their students’ access to education, denying them their fundamental rights.
In addition, based on the data that these ineffective charter school networks serve
predominately poor and minority populations,208 the charter schools may also “burden
poor and minority students disproportionately.”209 As explained previously, many char-
ters overwhelmingly enroll minority students210 and serve low-income populations.211
Additionally, these schools do not necessarily perform at a high level.212 Under the
Vergara I trial court’s suspect class equal protection analysis, charter schools may run
into the exact same issues that plagued the teacher tenure statutes in California.213
Because these charter schools impact the educational outcomes of minority and
low-income students and may affect their fundamental interest in education, the
charter-enabling statutes must survive strict scrutiny in order to be viable (applying
the Vergara I trial court framework).214 Many legal commentators have noted that
once courts apply strict scrutiny, the result is “fatal in fact.”215 Therefore, it is
unlikely that courts would uphold charter school systems or their enabling statutes
as constitutional. Just as grossly ineffective teachers deny minority students equal
access to education and infringe upon students’ fundamental interest in education,
charter schools suffer from the same issues. Although scholars have highlighted the
equal protection concerns of charter schools in the past,216 these theories have
greater resonance, applicability, and clarity after the Vergara I trial decision.
204 See supra Part II.
205 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (holding that educa-
tion is not a fundamental interest under the U.S. Constitution).
206 Huffman, supra note 9, at 1315.
207 See Vergara I, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27,
2014), rev’d, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 558 (Cal. Ct. App.), modified (May 3), review denied
(Aug. 22, 2016).
208 See, e.g., IMO Study, supra note 187 (in Chicago); LA. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 190,
at 2 (in New Orleans).
209 Vergara I, 2014 WL 6478415, at *4.
210 See Charter Schools, supra note 179.
211 LA. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 190.
212 See supra Section IV.B.
213 Vergara I, 2014 WL 6478415, at *4.
214 Id.
215 Huffman, supra note 9, at 1306.
216 See, e.g., id.; Welner, supra note 162.
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V. REFORMING TEACHER TENURE STATUTES ELIMINATES
THEIR EQUAL PROTECTION CONCERNS
The trial court in Vergara I noted that California’s teacher tenure statutes led to
a host of equal protection concerns.217 However, when we apply the same legal
framework to charter schools, in many cases they similarly fail to provide minorities
and low-income students with equal access to educational opportunities and may
deny students their right to education more generally. Our education systems need
another solution to resolve these equal protection issues. By reforming teacher
tenure statutes, rather than eliminating them, lawmakers can fix their potential con-
stitutional violations.
Reforming teacher tenure statutes will ensure that teachers keep their due
process rights218 and eliminate the teacher tenure statutes’ equal protection concerns.
First of all, other state courts in which teacher tenure has been challenged have held,
in fact, that tenure is a contractual, constitutionally protected right.219 Removing tenure
from our education systems altogether may raise additional constitutional violations.
If lawmakers lengthen the probationary period present in teacher tenure statutes,
administrators will be able to monitor teachers for an adequate length of time before
awarding them tenure privileges. A longer probation period will help ensure that
only qualified teachers enter the school system.220 Furthermore, to overhaul poten-
tially unconstitutional teacher tenure systems, reformers should streamline the pro-
cess for firing “grossly ineffective” instructors so that administrative staff can rid
schools of teachers with insufficient performance.221 Finally, making K–12 teacher
tenure more like university tenure systems—which employ strict screening pro-
cesses and longer probation periods222—would also eliminate the equal protection
issues raised by the current state of tenure.
217 Vergara I, 2014 WL 6478415, at *5–7 (holding that multiple teacher tenure statutes
were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause). While the Court of Appeal ul-
timately overturned this decision on “facial” grounds, it never determined that the teacher
tenure statutes were constitutional “as applied.” Therefore, the equal protection concerns raised
by the Vergara trial court decision may still apply in individualized, “as applied” consti-
tutional claims.
218 Arah N. Shumway, Teacher Tenure Reform in Wyoming: Bad Teachers Left Behind,
15 WYO. L. REV. 45, 52 (2015) (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972))
(noting that teacher tenure statutes afford teachers due process rights).
219 See N.C. Ass’n of Educators, Inc. v. State, 776 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d
as modified, 786 S.E.2d 255 (N.C. 2016).
220 Vergara I, 2014 WL 6478415, at *1, *5 (describing a sufficiently long probation period
as “critical for both students and teachers”).
221 See id.
222 See Shumway, supra note 218, at 54.
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A. Teacher Tenure Is Constitutionally Protected and Therefore Should Remain
in Place
Policymakers should not eliminate teacher tenure altogether because, as some
courts and scholars have argued, it is a constitutionally protected property right.223
Though teacher tenure has been under attack in several states, other state courts have
reached dramatically different conclusions regarding its constitutionality.224 In North
Carolina Ass’n of Educators, Inc. v. State,225 the court held that tenure is a part of
teachers’ constitutional right to contract.226 Prior to the case, the state legislature had
repealed North Carolina’s Career Status Law, threatening the existence of teacher ten-
ure.227 However, the court ultimately held that the federal228 and state229 constitutions
protected teachers’ tenure rights. Furthermore, other commentators have noted that “[i]n
states where courts have recognized that contractual rights inhere in the legislative
grant of employment benefits, the [Federal] Contract Clause may thus provide a
shield against lawmakers’ efforts to strip tenured teachers of their tenure rights.”230
B. The Trial Court in Vergara I Identifies the Solution to Equal Protection
Problems—Making Probation Periods Longer and Removing Obstacles to
Firing Ineffective Teachers
The trial-level decision in Vergara I actually states potential solutions to solving
the teacher tenure problem.231 In Vergara I, the evidence suggests that a probation-
ary period of less than two years—California’s probationary period length—does
not provide administrators with “enough time” to assess teacher quality.232 In Cali-
fornia, teachers who would have been weeded out in a longer observation period end
up receiving tenure. The trial court also described California as an “outlier” in the
length of its teacher tenure probationary period, and expert testimony from the case
223 Id. at 52.
224 See N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 776 S.E.2d at 11 (upholding teacher tenure statutes).
225 776 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. App. 2015).
226 Id. at 16.
227 Id. at 4.
228 Id. at 16.
229 Id. at 8, 18.
230 Recent Case, Constitutional Law—Contract Clause—North Carolina Superior Court
Holds That Law Eliminating Teacher Tenure Violates Tenured Teachers’ Constitutionally
Protected Contractual Rights.—North Carolina Ass’n of Educators, Inc. v. State, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 995, 1002 (2015) [hereinafter North Carolina Teacher Tenure].
231 Vergara I, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014),
rev’d, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 558 (Cal. Ct. App.), modified (May 3), review denied (Aug. 22,
2016).
232 Id. at *5 (stating that a probation period long enough for administrators to evaluate
teachers is “critical for both students and teachers”).
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states that a probationary period of three to five years would give administrators more
time to evaluate instruction, “mutual[ly] benefit[ting]” both students and teachers.233
Therefore, by making the tenure probationary period longer, reformers can
improve instructor screening and ensure that only qualified teachers receive tenure
in our nation’s schools. Lengthening tenure periods is the better strategy.234 Addi-
tionally, states making their teacher probation periods longer is not an unprecedented
practice; Michigan increased its teacher tenure probation period from four to five
years.235 Similarly, New Hampshire increased the length of its probation period from
three to five years.236 Scholar Kevin Welner notes that “[t]he first three to five years
of a teacher’s career generally see substantial improvement, so a pattern of hiring
inexperienced teachers can be detrimental to student learning.”237 Forty-one states
have a waiting period of three or more years before teachers are eligible to receive
tenure.238 Some opponents of shorter tenure periods have argued that three-year proba-
tion periods do not reflect teacher performance.239 In contrast, the probation periods
of nine states last four or five years.240 If California and other states with shorter
probation periods lengthen their probation periods to four or five years—after
which, as Welner notes, many teachers experience high levels of improvement241—
significantly fewer grossly ineffective instructors would receive tenure rights in the
first place. Then, lawmakers would no longer have to worry about equal protection
issues of teacher tenure systems.
In addition, some may argue that previous efforts to lengthen the probation period
in California have not been successful,242 but these past failures may not apply in a
post–Vergara I & II world. In 2005, lawmakers introduced Proposition 74, a mea-
sure to lengthen the probationary period from two to five years.243 The California
Teachers Association aggressively fought the initiative, increasing dues to raise $50
million to campaign against Proposition 74.244 Ultimately, Proposition 74 did not
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Laura McNeal, Total Recall: The Rise and Fall of Teacher Tenure, 30 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 489, 498 (2013); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 38.83(b)(1) (2015).
236 McNeal, supra note 235, at 499; see also N.H. REV STAT. ANN. § 189:14-a (2008 &
Supp. 2012).
237 Welner, supra note 162, at 140 n.66 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
238 Vergara I, 2014 WL 6478415, at *5.
239 Shumway, supra note 218, at 54–55.
240 Vergara I, 2014 WL 6478415, at *5.
241 Welner, supra note 162, at 140 n.66.
242 PATRICK MCGUINN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, RINGING THE BELL FOR K–12 TEACHER
TENURE REFORM, 1, 12–13 (2010), https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/is
sues/2010/02/pdf/teacher_tenure.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RPE-9T2U] (citing a 2005 proposal—
Proposition 74—to lengthen the probation period; ultimately, voters rejected the initiative).
243 Id. at 12.
244 Id.
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pass; only forty-five percent of voters supported the initiative.245 After the Vergara I
trial decision that highlighted the potential equal protection concerns of the Permanent
Employment Statute, an initiative like Proposition 74 might be more viable today.
Additionally, making it easier for school districts to remove ineffective teachers
with tenure may similarly alleviate equal protection concerns. Vergara I noted that
the Dismissal Statutes made it difficult for administrators to terminate problematic
teachers.246 When the Dismissal Statutes were in place, it was expensive and time-
consuming to fire teachers—costing $50,000 to $450,000 or more to undergo pro-
ceedings, which could take up to ten years.247 Ultimately, school districts were
reluctant to fire ineffective teachers simply because the process was too costly and
time-intensive.248 However, several states have reformed their tenure laws to make
it easier to fire bad teachers.249 For example, Alabama passed The Students First Act
of 2011,250 which limits the compensation that a teacher may receive during firing
proceedings and mandates that teachers must go to an administrative law judge to
appeal firing decisions.251 It also allows a school district greater deference in making
firing decisions, which makes the process faster.252 Another example comes from
Michigan.253 According to its teacher tenure laws, if a tenured teacher receives a
rating of “ineffective” or “highly ineffective” for three consecutive years, then the
school district must fire the teacher.254 If lawmakers in California introduce similar
measures to streamline their teacher tenure dismissal statutes, reformers will lessen
the equal protection concerns from their teacher tenure systems, making them more
likely to survive future constitutional attacks.
245 Id.
246 See Vergara I, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014),
rev’d, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 558 (Cal. Ct. App.), modified (May 3), review denied (Aug. 22,
2016); see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44934 (West 2015); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44938(b)(1)–(2)
(West 1995); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44944 (West 2016).
247 See Vergara I, 2014 WL 6478415, at *5.
248 Id. In New York, the process for firing teachers was so difficult that officials would
keep ineffective tenured teachers in “rubber rooms”—offices in which these individuals
would do nothing all day but continue to be paid. See WAITING FOR SUPERMAN (Walden
Media, Participant Media 2010). After negative media coverage of the “rubber rooms,”
officials have since abolished rubber room reassignment centers in New York. Ed Pilkington,
New York to Erase ‘Rubber Rooms’ for Suspended Teachers, GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2010,
1:50 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/16/new-york-teacher-rubber-rooms
[https://perma.cc/R9BV-PNXZ]. Before rubber rooms were abolished in June 2010, 600
tenured teachers had occupied them. Should Teachers Get Tenure?, supra note 37.
249 See, e.g., McNeal, supra note 235, at 497–504.
250 ALA. CODE § 16-24C-4 (2011).
251 McNeal, supra note 235, at 497.
252 Id.
253 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 38.83(b)(1) (2011).
254 McNeal, supra note 235, at 498.
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C. Modeling K–12 Tenure Infrastructure on University Professor Tenure Systems
May Further Eliminate Equal Protection Concerns
In state university systems, as well as many private university systems, teacher
tenure involves a significantly more comprehensive evaluation process.255 For ex-
ample, many instructors at the college level are required to wait seven years in order
to get a shot at tenure.256
Additionally, some have advocated that making K–12 teacher tenure more like
the university system will ensure that only the most highly qualified instructors
make it to our elementary, middle, and high schools across the United States.257 For
example, Dean Cordeiro of the University of San Diego’s School of Leadership and
Education has suggested that her institution—which uses fourteen different metrics
in order to determine whether a teacher is worthy of tenure—may provide a model
for K–12 school administrators.258 The current state of K–12 teacher tenure lacks
this comprehensive evaluation process.259 If elementary, middle, and high schools
use a more thorough vetting process—such as the University of San Diego’s evalua-
tion strategy260—only the most qualified teachers would receive tenure, therefore
boosting the quality of education at schools.
Additionally, other advocates of teacher tenure reform have noted that K–12
systems should adopt preliminary reviews during the probation period.261 David
Willingham, a professor of psychology at the University of Virginia, remarked that
administrator feedback prior to a tenure decision could help teachers with self-
assessment.262 The review at the end of the third year could “provide[ ] useful
255 See, e.g., Mario Koran, Wanna Fix Teacher Tenure? Look to Universities, VOICE SAN




258 Dean Cordeiro Discusses Teacher Tenure at Voice of San Diego’s Politifest, U. SAN
DIEGO SCH. LEADERSHIP & EDUC. SCI., http://www.sandiego.edu/soles/news/news_detail
.php?_focus=48687 [https://perma.cc/L98Q-9RJ7] [hereinafter Dean Cordeiro Discusses
Teacher Tenure] (“In . . . the School of Leadership and Education . . . we’re looking at
teaching in many ways, not only the evaluations that students do, but also we’re looking at
the syllabus itself. People go in and visit your classrooms . . . . Teachers do enormous service
within their schools and in their communities. [K–12 school districts] don’t even factor that
in, and that service plays a major role in what they bring into the classroom when they try
to form partnerships. . . . We have a lot to learn from good promotion tenure system in higher
ed[ucation].”(quoting Dean Polla Cordeiro)).
259 MCGUINN, supra note 242, at 2.
260 Dean Cordeiro Discusses Teacher Tenure, supra note 258.
261 See, e.g., Daniel Willingham, 2 Years Isn’t Enough: What K–12 Can Learn from Higher
Ed on Tenure, REAL CLEAR EDUC. (July 15, 2014), http://www.realcleareducation.com/articles
/2014/07/15/teacher_tenure_education_higher_ed_1054.html [https://perma.cc/7L8U-Z29J].
262 See, e.g., id.
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information to the candidate to know where he or she stands and what needs to be
improved in the next few years. It also gives the university a chance to fire someone
if things are going really poorly.”263
By taking a page from the university playbook and applying it in the K–12
tenure context, public schools could ensure that only highly qualified instructors
make it through the screening process. This way, California and the other states with
short teacher tenure probationary periods264 could ensure that they minimize the
number of ineffective teachers receiving tenure. Ultimately, by making K–12 teacher
tenure schemes more like those of universities, reformers will ensure better educa-
tional outcomes for our nation’s children.
CONCLUSION
There are many reasons for maintaining teacher tenure laws. Tenure is a valu-
able asset to our educational landscape. It motivates the best teachers to work at
troubled schools, attracts talent that may be swayed by better employment prospects
elsewhere, and ensures that teachers in the system encounter less discrimination and
bias.265 Additionally, some courts have acknowledged that it is an integral part of
teachers’ constitutional rights under the Contract Clause.266
Although teacher tenure laws serve a beneficial purpose, the laws may violate
equal protection if they enable ineffective teachers to gain tenure and make it dif-
ficult to terminate these teachers.267 Unfortunately, proposed alternatives, such as
charter schools, create near-identical legal concerns and problems.268 Like the
unqualified teachers in poor and minority-dominated school districts in Vergara I
& II, charter school systems may similarly hurt poor and minority students dispro-
portionally.269 Because many low-preforming charters may also deny students their
fundamental right to education, they may be similarly unconstitutional under a strict
scrutiny analysis.270 Therefore, charter schools are an unsuitable alternative to prob-
lematic teacher tenure laws.
263 Id.
264 See, e.g., AMBER M. WINKLER, JANIE SCULL & DARA ZEEHANDELAAR, THOMAS B.
FORDHAM INST., HOW STRONG ARE U.S. TEACHER UNIONS? A STATE-BY-STATE COM-
PARISON 176, 266 (2012), http://edex.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/publication/pdfs/2012
1029-Union-Strength-Full-Report_7_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WTB-WMQU] (noting that
North Dakota has a probationary period of two years and that Maine had recently decreased
its probationary period from three years to two years).
265 Should Teachers Get Tenure?, supra note 37.
266 North Carolina Teacher Tenure, supra note 230, at 1002.
267 See Vergara I, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *1, *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27,
2014), rev’d, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 558 (Cal. Ct. App.), modified (May 3), review denied
(Aug. 22, 2016).
268 See supra Part IV.
269 LA. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 190.
270 Welner, supra note 162, at 140.
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Reforming teacher tenure laws will ensure that teachers maintain their constitu-
tional rights and that qualified teachers remain in the field, leading to better educa-
tional outcomes for our nation’s children.271 First of all, these laws should include
longer probationary periods to provide school administrators with more time to
assess teachers’ abilities. Longer probation periods will prevent ineffective teachers
from receiving tenure. Although past attempts to lengthen the probation periods
have not been universally successful, they may be more viable within the context of
today’s reform-oriented litigation. Additionally, reformers should change states’
dismissal statutes to ensure that administrators can fire ineffective teachers easily
and efficiently. Finally, because universities have experimented with tenure systems
and proven that more stringent tenure vetting standards can help colleges retain and
attract talented professionals, it is clear that longer probation systems and stricter
evaluation processes can work at the K–12 level. By fixing tenure statutes, our
leaders will help our children attain the best possible educational outcomes. The
future of our nation depends on it.
271 See, e.g., WINKLER, SCULL & ZEEHANDELAAR, supra note 264.
